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Summary
The recent election of Benjamin Netanjahu as the new prime minister of Israel has created apprehensi-
ons, particularly among the country's Arab neighbours, that the peace process in the Middle East could
result in deadlock or even fail. First Arab reactions to he change in the political eadership have been
characterised by a mistrust of Netanjahu and of his coalition government. However, both the summit
meeting of the Arab League held on 22/23 June, 1996 and the diplomatic activities of leading Arab
politicians have made it clear that those countries which have already concluded peace treaties with
Israel have no wish to jeopardise them. Even Syria whose negotiations with Israel were suspended
months ago does not seem to wish to exacerbate he situation.
Against his background, Israel nd Jordan are the countries which could have a key role to play: Bi-
laterally, their relations have already improved considerably on the basis of the peace treaty of 1994.
But this treaty also contains a multilateral provision which still remains to be fulfilled: this is that both
Parties have committed themselves to the creation of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in
the Middle East (CSCME) along the lines of the Helsinki (CSCE) process. There is to date, however,
no evidence of any activity on either side to im plement this part of the peace treaty.
This Report examines the question as to whether or not it would make sense to create a CSCME in
addition, or as an alternative to i her the Madrid peace process which seems to stagger along tena-
ciously, or the Mediterranean conference, initiated by the European Union some months ago, which
also involves part of the Middle East region. Since the authors of the Israeli-Jordan plan obviously had
the 'success-model' of the CSCE in mind, this Report also looks at some of the basic factors and cir-
cumstances responsible for the success of the CSCE and tries to discover whether or not comparable
conditions exist in the Middle East, particularly:
· a geographical delimitation of the region that makes ense politically and ensures that all parties
involved in conflicts in the region and necessary for their solution are included in the negotiations;
· the presence of 'important' parties prepared to ake the initiative in extending invitations, in spon-
soring or moderating such negotiations;
· the willingness of the parties involved in regional conflicts both to contribute to heir solu tion
without recourse to military action or other means of force (except for the purpose of self-defence)
and to consider future developments 'open-mindedly' in the sense that fron tiers and zones of in-
fluence can be amended by peaceful means and by agreement;
· a broad concept of 'security' which includes both co-operation as a means of achieving common
security, and package deals to arrive at a balanced compensation f give and take; and finally
· a willingness to embark on a lengthy process of compensation f interests, trust in the con fidence
building quality of verifiable agreements and the healthy effect of implementation debates where
alleged cases of non-implementation must be explained.
Although all the conditions under which a possible CSCME would have to be organised are too intri-
cate to justify their comparison with the European situation of the early seventies, the following crite-
ria provide a useful framework for a debate:
· today it is no longer possible to juxtapose the states of the Middle East against each other as anta-
gonists of an East-West conflict, neither can these countries profit any more finan cially from such
a confrontation. On the contrary: the global situation has developed in the opposite direction, ma-
nifesting a general tendency and willingness to help bring peace to the region, and even to pay for
it;
· one Middle East state appears to fulfil the main criteria required to extend an invitation to
CSCME-consultations, amely Egypt. The country has the necessary political weight, dip lomatic
relations with all of the potential participants, and has for many years actively pro moted the peace
process;
· although 'refraining from the threat or use of force' is not yet a principle applied by all par ties to
conflicts in the region, it does at least figure in all declarations governing the relations of Israel
with Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Council;
· it is furthermore an open question whether the parties to a CSCME will comprehend, ur ing the
multilateral negotiating process, that mutual nd common security cannot be reached overnight:
intermediate steps will first be required in order to build confidence; and that 'conventional thin-
king' can only be overcome by open debates on the implementation f, or the difficulties in im-
plementing agreed measures.
All of these are arguments in favour of a negotiated peace. This is the aim of the Madrid peace process
which started in October 1991, and which was haped after the CSCE model. The same is also true for
the Mediterranean Conference, convened in Barcelona by the European Community in November
1995, in which a part of the Middle East region is represented. This Report tries to establish therefore
why 'Madrid' has not so far become a synonym for success in the way 'Helsinki' did, and why Barce-
lona cannot replace a CSCME.
The Madrid peace negotiations run along four bilateral tracks - those between Israel and the Palesti-
nians, and with Jordan, the Lebanon and Syria; multilateral negotiations are held in five working
groups, each addressing a specific subject and involving a great number of states of which only a few
actually belong to the region. A comparison of these two levels of negotiation shows that the bilateral
one is the more important of the two. When difficulties arise on a bilateral track, talks on the same
subject hen stagnate in the multilateral working group: the September 1993 Oslo agreement which in
turn led to the Gaza-Jericho agreement, and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan of October
1994 stimulated talks at the multilateral level.
Thus, the structure of the Madrid peace process differs from that of the CSCE in two impor tant ways:
in its focus on bilateral negotiations, and in the open-endedness of its multilateral negotiations in
which an ever greater number of non-regional states and organisations partici pate. Each of these fac-
tors appears to have been detrimental to a smooth development of the process. The multilateral nego-
tiations in particular suffer from repeated bouts of stagnation. Positive post-1993 results were due to
progress in the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the PLO, and between Israel and Jordan. The
Madrid process therefore can draw nearer the aims of its initiators only if there were to be progress in
the negotiations between Israel and Syria, and between Israel and the Lebanon. Even then, however,
the final aim of a compre hensive peace in the region still cannot be realised since two of its states are
excluded: Iraq and Iran. The very fact that their present regimes are both notorious trouble-shooters
and Is rael's arch-enemies should induce the initiators of a CSCME to bind them in into any lasting
regional settlement. There is also reason to believe that the large number of outer-regional participants
involved in the Madrid process is less than helpful from the point of view that their understanding of
'peace' only partly coincides with that of the states of the region; furthermore, they do not always play
the role which the regional parties expect of them.
The Barcelona Mediterranean Conference, on the other hand, is of very recent date and the measures it
has so far contemplated - in particular preparations for a Free Trade Zone - carry a fulfilment deadline
as far into the future as 2010. Nothing very definite can as yet be said about he success of this endea-
vour. One point, however, is quite clear: its main emphasis will be on economic o-operation, in parti-
cular with the Maghreb and much less with the Middle East region.
Since both 'Madrid' and 'Barcelona' appear to have encountered difficulties in realising a comprehensi-
ve peace settlement for the Middle East, it does indeed seem worthwhile considering a new departure:
to promote the idea of a 'Conference on Security and Co- operation in the Middle East'.
The participants of this Conference ought to comprise the states of the 'central zone', i.e. Israel, its
Arab neighbours and the Palestinian Council; the member-states of the Gulf Co- operation Council;
and also those states which to varying degrees are involved in conflicts geographically located bet-
ween the Mediterranean d the Persian-Arabian Gulf, i.e. Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Cyprus. The invitati-
on should be based on one of the most important criteria which enabled the Europeans and North
Americans to accept he Finnish invitation to the 'Helsinki Consultations': the participation of govern-
ments in the consultations and negotiations does not constitute a legal recognition of the existing poli-
tical conditions in the region. All those states and organisations outside the Middle East region which
have for years engaged themselves politically, militarily or economically in the area, such as the Uni-
ted States, the United Nations, the Russian Federation and the European Union, should play an im-
portant role in the process, but rather that of a moderator deprived of the right to vote, whilst other
interested states such as Japan could be given observer status (as in the case of the OSCE) - to underli-
ne the character of a CSCME as a regional conference which places the interests of the parties directly
concerned at the centre of its attention.
It should in principle be possible to put all questions of security and co-operation which are of im-
portance to he region, on the agenda of a CSCME. It seems, however, likely that agree ments can be
reached more easily on some subject matters than on others. The parties to the Conference would the-
refore be well advised to start off with only five of the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act, i.e.
refraining from the threat or use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in in-
ternal affairs, co-operation among states and the fulfilment in good faith of obligations under interna-
tional aw. Such a catalogue commonly agreed between the participants of a CSCME would in itself
already constitute a great success.
· The principle 'Refraining from the threat or use of force' is part of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and should be supported by all regional parties to the Conference, ven by those which at
present do not represent a state authority.
· The principle 'Peaceful settlement of disputes' might induce Iran and Iraq - if invited to the Confe-
rence - to return to a system of international l w to which they had already obliged themselves
when joining the United Nations, since their participation in this Conference would put an end to
their isolation.
· The principle 'Non-intervention in internal affairs' is also a part of the UN Charter and fre quently
invoked by Israel and its Arab neighbours. The last paragraph of this principle, as formulated in
the Helsinki Final Act, is of particular interest under present Middle East conditions: The partici-
pants of the CSCE agreed that they will '...refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist ac-
tivities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of
another participating State.'
· The principle 'Co-operation among States' opens up ossibilities for fields of interstate relations
beyond the intricate security problems and the fundamental differences behind them, and provide
participants with opportunities to better understanding and appreciation f the importance and use-
fulness of good neighbourly relations.
· Finally, the principle 'Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law' - the Xth
principle of the Helsinki Final Act - would seem to be suitable for inclusion in a Final Document
of a first CSCME since all parties to conflicts in the Middle East consider it very important to ful-
fil acrimoniously any treaty once it has been concluded.
On the other hand, the Conference could be blocked at an early stage if participants attempted during
the first round of negotiations to agree on common formulae of controversial principles such asso-
vereign equality, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, or similarly if they attempted to define together the meaning of human rights' criteria such
as freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. When embarking on an inter-cultural dialogue on
human rights issues, participants must be very cautious. By no means ought his dialogue to be over-
shadowed by other topics nor should it be misused as negotiating fat to obtain better esults in other
fields. The criteria worked out by the 1990 CSCE Conference in Copenhagen on the subject of Natio-
nal Minorities could be studied with a view to their suitability for the settlement of inter-ethnic con-
flicts in the Middle-East.
A CSCME would also be well advised, in the beginning, not to be too ambitious in terms of reducing
military hardware and to content itself, like the CSCE, with a discussion of Confi dence Building
Measures such asthe prior notification of major military manoeuvres and the voluntary exchange of
observers. Since the potential participants' interests in economic o-op eration seem to differ consider-
ably, they would be well advised to start off by ending all forms of boycotts and similar restrictions.
The facilitation of tourism across the border, family reunification, a better exchange of information,
youth exchanges and other such steps might later culminate in a v st system of international arrange-
ments such asthe 'human dimension' of the CSCE/OSCE.
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